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I. Introduction
Congress amended § 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code1
in 1996, inserting the word “physical” into § 104(a)(2)’s “personal
injury or sickness” exclusion from gross income.2 Section
104(a)(2)’s gross income exclusion now applies to only damages
received “on account of personal physical injuries or physical
sickness.”3 Congress’s amendment further provided that
“emotional distress shall not be treated as a physical injury or
physical sickness.”4 Before Congress’s change, the exclusion from
gross income applied to all “personal injuries,” regardless of
whether they were physical, nonphysical, or emotional.5
Since Congress amended § 104(a)(2), courts have struggled to
uniformly apply the exclusion and have begun to extend it beyond
only physical injuries and physical sicknesses.6 Part of this
struggle is due to the inherent difficulty with defining the word
“physical.”7 Significantly, however, the struggle is mostly to do
with the fact that the judicial test used to determine what
amounts fall within § 104(a)(2)’s exclusion developed when the

1. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2006). Unless otherwise provided, all section
references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
2. See infra Part IV (discussing the Small Business Job Protection Act of
1996).
3. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (emphasis added).
4. I.R.C. § 104(a) (flush language).
5. See United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 235 n.6 (1992) (noting that
the exclusion’s scope had previously been limited to only physical injuries, but
that it was now settled that it extended to “nonphysical injuries to the
individual”).
6. See infra Part VI (discussing the conflicting Tax Court cases).
7. See G. Christopher Wright, Comment, Taxation of Personal Injury
Awards: Addressing the Mind/Body Dualism that Plagues § 104(a)(2) of the Tax
Code, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 211, 211 (2010) (noting the difficulty faced when
attempting to define “physical”).
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exclusion applied to all “personal injuries.”8 Although Congress
limited § 104(a)(2)’s exclusion to only physical injuries and
physical sicknesses, courts have not adjusted the test used to
determine what amounts fall within the exclusion.9 This Note
proposes that courts modify the test used to exclude damage
awards under § 104(a)(2) to accommodate the added “physical”
requirement.10 The proposed test will allow § 104(a)(2) to be
uniformly applied to only physical injuries and physical
sicknesses in the way that Congress intended.
Every year taxpayers must calculate their gross income to
determine the tax they must pay. To do this, taxpayers must
know what amounts are included in gross income under § 6111
and what amounts can be excluded from gross income under
other Tax Code provisions. In 2011, disputes over what amounts
are included in gross income and what amounts can be excluded
were among the most litigated taxation issues.12 Personal injury
claimants—physical and nonphysical—are awarded millions of
dollars each year.13 Thus, § 104(a)(2)’s gross income exclusion is
consistently one of the most litigated exclusionary provisions.14

8. See Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 336–37 (1995) (determining that
for a recovery to be excluded under § 104(a)(2), a taxpayer must establish that
the “cause of action giving rise to the recovery [was] ‘based upon tort or tort type
rights’” and that the “damages were received ‘on account of personal injuries or
sickness’”).
9. See Amos v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2003-329, at 4 (2003) (“The 1996
amendment does not otherwise change the requirements of section 104(a)(2) or
the analysis set forth in Commissioner v. Schleier; it imposes an additional
requirement for an amount to qualify for exclusion from gross income under
that section.” (citation omitted)).
10. See infra Part VII (proposing a new test).
11. I.R.C. § 61 (2006) (providing the Tax Code’s definition of gross income).
12. See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 56
(2011), www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/irs_tas_arc2011_exec_summary.pdf.
13. See Genny Barret, Note, Did the Sixth Circuit Get It Right in Stadnyk?
What To Do About the § 104(a)(2) Personal Injury Damages Exclusion, 2011
BYU L. REV. 1193, 1193 (2011) (“Each year, millions of dollars are awarded to
victims of physical and non-physical personal injury.”).
14. See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 472
(2008), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/08_tas_arc_mli.pdf (“Taxation of damage
awards spurs litigation every year.”); see also Wright, supra note 7, at 211
(noting that § 104(a)(2)’s exclusion is one of the most litigated issues in federal
courts).
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Part II of this Note outlines the history of the “personal
injury” exclusion before Congress added the word “physical.”15
Part III discusses judicial opinions limiting the scope of
§ 104(a)(2)’s “on account of” language.16 Congress’s amendment to
§ 104(a)(2) is detailed in Part IV,17 and the circuit courts’
response to the amendment is discussed in Part V.18 Part VI of
this Note analyzes three Tax Court cases that illustrate the
struggle in applying the amended § 104(a)(2) exclusion.19 To
remedy the confusion surrounding § 104(a)(2)’s exclusion since its
amendment, this Note proposes a new judicial test in Part VII.20
Finally, this Note concludes in Part VIII.21
II. Development of the “Personal Injury” Exclusion
A. Early Development
Before the first personal injury exclusion appeared in
Chapter 18, § 213(b)(6) of the Revenue Act of 1918,22 the U.S.
Department of the Treasury (Treasury) indicated, in Treasury
Decision 2135, that amounts received for personal injury were
taxable as “gains or profits and income derived from any source
whatsoever.”23 Treasury Regulation 33, which stated, “An amount
received as the result of a suit or compromise for personal injury,
being similar to the proceeds of accident insurance, is to be
15. See infra Part II (discussing the personal injury exclusion’s history).
16. See infra Part III (discussing judicial opinions interpreting “on account
of”).
17. See infra Part IV (discussing the 1996 amendments).
18. See infra Part V (discussing circuit court opinions following the 1996
amendments).
19. See infra Part VI (discussing three conflicting Tax Court opinions).
20. See infra Part VII (proposing a new test).
21. See infra Part VIII (conclusion).
22. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1066.
23. T.D. 2135, 17 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 39, 42 (1915) (“An amount received
as a result of suit or compromise for ‘pain and suffering’ is held to be such
income as would be taxable under the provision of law that includes ‘gains or
profits and income derived from any source whatsoever.’”); see also Patrick E.
Hobbs, The Personal Injury Exclusion: Congress Gets Physical But Leaves the
Exclusion Emotionally Distressed, 76 NEB. L. REV. 51, 56–57 (1997) (noting
Treasury’s early treatment of personal injury awards).
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accounted for as income,” later confirmed Treasury’s indication.24
The tax treatment of personal injury awards changed in 1918,
however, when the Attorney General urged Treasury to find
accident insurance proceeds nontaxable.25
The Attorney General’s opinion rested on the idea that
accident insurance proceeds represented a return of capital.26
With tangible assets such as real property, the taxpayer’s
invested capital is measured by the amount the taxpayer paid to
acquire the property.27 This acquisition “cost” can be
subsequently adjusted.28 This cost is the taxpayer’s basis in such
property.29 Later, when a taxpayer disposes of the property, she is
only taxed on the amount in excess of her basis, or gain.30 The
amount she receives equaling her basis in the property is her
“return of capital” and is not taxed.31
Applied to personal injury damages, the return of capital
approach excludes from income damages equaling the taxpayer’s
capital invested in oneself.32 This “human capital” theory stands
for the principle that accident proceeds and damage awards
24. Treas. Reg. § 33, art. 4 (1918); see also Hobbs, supra note 23, at 57
(stating that Regulation 33 confirmed that Treasury regarded personal injury
awards as taxable).
25. See 31 Op. Att’y Gen. 304 (1918) (urging Treasury to find accident
insurance proceeds excludable from income); see also Hobbs, supra note 23, at
57 (noting that the tax treatment of personal injury awards reversed in 1918
when the Attorney General urged Treasury to find accident insurance proceeds
excludable from income).
26. See 31 Op. Att’y Gen. at 308 (arguing that accident proceeds “merely
take the place of capital in human ability which was destroyed by the accident”);
see also Hobbs, supra note 23, at 63 (discussing the Attorney General’s
extension of “the notion of capital value replacement to the human body”).
27. See I.R.C. § 1012 (2006) (defining basis in one’s property as “the cost of
such property”).
28. See id. § 1016 (adjusting basis “for expenditures, receipts, losses, or
other items, properly chargeable to [a] capital account”).
29. See id. § 1012 (defining basis as “the cost of such property”).
30. See id. § 1001 (providing that a taxpayer’s gain on such property is the
difference between the “amount realized” and the basis in the property).
31. See Debra Cohen-Whelan, From Injury to Income: The Taxation of
Punitive Damages “On Account Of” United States v. Schleier, 71 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 913, 920 (1996) (“The return of capital approach, as applied to the taxation
of personal injury damages, excludes from income damages equal to the
taxpayer’s capital invested in the injured item.”).
32. Id.
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should not be taxed because the proceeds are merely a substitute
for capital invested in oneself that was diminished in the
accident.33 Because the proceeds represent a “return of capital”
equal to the taxpayer’s invested capital in herself, the proceeds do
not increase the taxpayer’s wealth.34 Instead, the accident
proceeds simply return the taxpayer to her pre-injury condition.35
This approach is difficult, however, because invested “human
capital” in terms of cost to the owner—the owner’s basis—is often
zero.36 Moreover, if cost could theoretically be established, it is
nearly impossible for a court to allocate accident proceeds to an
abstract notion of “human capital.”37
Nonetheless, Treasury accepted the Attorney General’s
rationale when it issued Treasury Decision 2747.38 Treasury
Decision 2747 excluded personal injury awards from income,
stating that “an amount received by an individual as a result of a
suit or compromise for personal injuries sustained by him
through accident is not income.”39 Congress agreed with
Treasury, and promptly codified the exclusion when it passed the
Revenue Act of 1918.40 At the time, Congress believed personal
33. See Hobbs, supra note 23, at 63 (“This human capital argument rests on
the principle that if an ability or function of the human body, which previously
allowed the taxpayer to produce income, is diminished through an accident,
then the proceeds are merely a substitute for that ability or function.”).
34. See Cohen-Whelan, supra note 31, at 919–20 (stating that a return of
capital does not increase wealth).
35. See id. at 919 (explaining that damages would “return the taxpayer to
her pre-injury condition”).
36. See Hobbs, supra note 23, at 64 (explaining that often “[t]he cost to the
owner of ‘human capital’ is zero”); see also Roemer v. Comm’r, 716 F.2d 693, 696
n.2 (9th Cir. 1983) (“[T]here is no tax basis in a person’s health and other
personal interests . . . .”).
37. See Gregory L. Germain, Taxing Emotional Injury Recoveries: A
Critical Analysis of Murphy v. Internal Revenue Service, 60 ARK. L. REV. 185,
278 (2007) (stating that it would be “virtually impossible” for courts to
determine how much of an “award compensated for the loss of one’s own
consumption of human capital”).
38. T.D. 2747, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 457 (1918); see Hobbs, supra note 23,
at 64 (noting Treasury’s acceptance of the Attorney General’s rationale).
39. T.D. 2747, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 457 (1918); see Hobbs, supra note 23,
at 64.
40. See Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1066 (“Amounts
received, through accident or health insurance or under workmen’s
compensation acts, as compensation for personal injuries or sickness, plus the
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injury compensation payments to be a return of human capital,
and thus not constitutionally taxable “income” under the
Sixteenth Amendment.41
Although the statute used the language “personal injuries or
sickness,”42 Treasury rejected extending the exclusion to the
alienation of a wife’s affections, interpreting the exclusion to
apply to “physical injuries only.”43 Later, however, in the wake of
the now-overruled U.S. Supreme Court decision, Eisner v.
Macomber,44 in which the Court defined income narrowly to
include “gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both
combined,”45 Treasury created an administrative exclusion for
nonphysical personal injuries.46 Treasury’s administrative
exclusion became a judicial exclusion in 1927 when the Board of
Tax Appeals—now the Tax Court—relied on Eisner’s narrow
definition of income to determine that a settlement award in a
defamation suit was not taxable “income.”47 Twenty-eight years
later, the Supreme Court drastically broadened its definition of
income in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass, Co.48 to include any
amount of any damages received whether by suit or agreement on account of
such injuries or sickness.”).
41. See Dotson v. United States, 87 F.3d 682, 685 (5th Cir. 1996)
(“Congress first enacted the personal injury compensation exclusion . . . when
such payments were considered the return of human capital, and thus not
constitutionally taxable ‘income’ under the 16th Amendment.”).
42. Revenue Act of 1918 § 213(b)(6).
43. S. 1384, 2 C.B. 71 (1920); see Hobbs, supra note 23, at 66 (discussing
Senate Bill 1384 and that Treasury “rejected the extension of the ‘human
capital’ approach to every personal injury”).
44. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 219 (1920) (holding that a “stock
dividend” was not income).
45. Id. at 207.
46. See Sol. Op. 132, 1 C.B. 92 (1922) (determining that damages received
for alienation of affections, defamation, and for the surrender of child custody
rights were excludable from income); see also Hobbs, supra note 23, at 67
(discussing Treasury’s conclusion in Solicitor’s Opinion 132 that the receipts at
issue were excludable from gross income based upon the Supreme Court’s
decision in Eisner).
47. See Hawkins v. Comm’r, 6 B.T.A. 1023, 1024 (1927) (relying on Eisner
to conclude that a taxpayer’s settlement award in a defamation suit was
excludable from income); see also Hobbs, supra note 23, at 67–68 (discussing the
court’s analysis and conclusion in Hawkins).
48. Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass, Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955) (holding that
punitive damages fell within I.R.C. § 22(a)’s definition of income because they
were “instances of undeniable accession to wealth, clearly realized, and over
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“accession to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the
taxpayers have complete dominion.”49 In Glenshaw, the Court
observed that Congress intended “to tax all gains except those
specifically exempted.”50 Despite this broad definition, the
personal injury exclusion—now § 104(a)(2)—continued to be
applied to nonphysical personal injuries.51
B. The “Personal Injury” Exclusion After Glenshaw Glass
In Glenshaw Glass, the Court reiterated that “personal
injury recoveries [were] nontaxable on the theory that they
roughly correspond to a return of capital.”52 The Court
determined, however, that the same restoration-of-capital theory
could not justify excluding punitive damages from income.53
Subsequent to Glenshaw Glass, the Internal Revenue Service
(the Service) issued a series of revenue rulings reaffirming that
nonphysical personal injury receipts were excludable from
income.54 And in 1972, in Seay v. Commissioner,55 the Tax Court
which the taxpayers have complete dominion”).
49. Id. at 432.
50. Id. at 430.
51. See infra Part II.B (discussing the exclusion after Glenshaw Glass).
52. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 432 n.8.
53. Id.
54. See Rev. Rul. 55-132, 1955-1 C.B. 213 (holding that former World War
II prisoners-of-war’s receipts for losses of personal rights were not includable in
gross income); Rev. Rul. 56-462, 1956-2 C.B. 20 (determining that payments
made to former Korean War captives “as compensation for the loss of their
personal rights . . . [were] not includible in the gross income”); Rev. Rul. 56-518,
1956-2 C.B. 25 (“[C]ompensation paid by . . . Germany to citizens or residents of
the United States . . . on account of . . . damage to life, body, health, liberty, or to
professional or economic advancement, are in the nature of reimbursement for
the deprivation of civil or personal rights and do not constitute taxable
income . . . .”); Rev. Rul. 58-370, 1958-2 C.B. 14 (determining that, for the same
reasons as in Revenue Ruling 56-518, compensation paid by the Federal
Republic of Austria did not constitute taxable income); see also Hobbs, supra
note 23, at 70 (discussing the Service’s rulings and their renewal of the position
that nonphysical personal injury receipts were excludable).
55. Seay v. Comm’r, 58 T.C. 32, 37 (1972) (holding that § 104(a)(2) excluded
the taxpayer’s settlement award for personal injury claims); see Hobbs, supra
note 23, at 71–72 (discussing the Tax Court decision in Seay and noting that the
decision was the first time a court addressed the “application of the statutory
exclusion to nonphysical injuries”).
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similarly reaffirmed that the exclusion extended to nonphysical
injuries.56 In Seay, the Tax Court concluded that a $45,000
payment as “compensation for . . . personal embarrassment,
mental and physical strain and injury to health and personal
reputation” was excludable from income under § 104(a)(2).57 The
court cited Revenue Ruling 58-418, and its earlier decision in
Hawkins v. Commissioner,58 in support of its conclusion that the
payment at issue fell within § 104(a)(2)’s exclusion.59 Hawkins
had analogized recovery for injury to personal reputation with
compensation by way of life insurance proceeds, and found
damages received for libel and slander to be excluded from
income.60
Eleven years later, the Ninth Circuit seemingly erased any
doubt as to whether § 104(a)(2)’s personal injury exclusion
applied to nonphysical personal injuries in Roemer v.
Commissioner.61 In Roemer, the Ninth Circuit reversed the Tax
Court’s decision below, concluding that an entire jury award in a
defamation suit was excludable from income under § 104(a)(2).62
But shortly thereafter, the Service issued Revenue Ruling 85143,63 stating that it would follow the Tax Court’s conclusion
including the defamation award in income, rather than the Ninth
Circuit’s reversal.64 Finally, however, the Tax Court ended the
56. See Seay, 58 T.C. at 38 (finding that § 104(a)(2) extended to the
taxpayer’s nonphysical personal injuries).
57. Id.
58. Hawkins v. Comm’r, 6 B.T.A. 1023 (1927) (holding that damages
received for libel and slander were excludable from income).
59. See Seay, 58 T.C. at 40 (stating that Hawkins and Revenue Ruling 54518 supported the finding that the payment at issue was exempt from taxation
under § 104(a)(2)).
60. See Hawkins, 6 B.T.A. at 1024–25 (analogizing a recovery for injury to
personal reputation with compensation by way of life insurance proceeds, and
finding the damages at issue to be excludable from income).
61. See Roemer v. Comm’r, 716 F.2d 693, 697 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that
a defamation award was excludable from income because “[t]he ordinary
meaning of a personal injury is not limited to a physical one”).
62. See id. at 700–01 (concluding that the award was excludable from gross
income under § 104(a)(2)).
63. Rev. Rul. 85-143, 1985-2 C.B. 55.
64. See id. (stating that the Service would not follow the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in Roemer and would instead follow the Tax Court’s decision including
the defamation award in income).
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debate in Threlkeld v. Commissioner65 when it determined that
“personal injury” was not limited to a “physical injury.”66
Congress, though, would have its voice heard on the matter
before the end of the decade.67
C. The 1989 Amendments
In 1989, the House of Representatives proposed amending
§ 104(a)(2) to read, “[G]ross income does not include . . . the
amount of any damages received . . . on account of personal
injuries or sickness in a case involving physical injury or physical
sickness.”68 According to the accompanying committee report, the
House was attempting to override judicial applications of
§ 104(a)(2)’s exclusion to nonphysical personal injuries.69
Congress rejected the proposed amendment, however.70 Instead,
the final amendment read, “[Section 104(a)(2)] shall not apply to
any punitive damages in connection with a case not involving
physical injury or physical sickness.”71 The final amendment
“impliedly extended § 104(a)(2) to compensatory awards for
nonphysical injuries,”72 a result contrary to the House’s proposed

65. Threlkeld v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 1294, 1305 (1986) (stating that § 104(a)(2)
extended beyond physical injuries).
66. See id. (“A personal injury has long been understood to include
nonphysical as well as physical injuries.”).
67. See infra Part II.C (discussing the 1989 amendments to § 104(a)(2)).
68. H.R. 3299, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, § 11641 (1989) (emphasis
added); see also Hobbs, supra note 23, at 74 (noting that the House of
Representatives proposed the amendment).
69. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-247, at 1344–55 (1989) (stating that courts had
extended § 104(a)(2) to “awards for personal injury that do not relate to a
physical injury or sickness” and that the “committee believes that such
treatment is inappropriate where no physical injury or sickness is involved”); see
also Hobbs, supra note 23, at 74 (“The accompanying committee report
confirmed the House’s recognition that courts were interpreting § 104(a)(2) too
broadly.”).
70. See Hobbs, supra note 23, at 74 (“The conference committee rejected the
proposed amendment . . . .”).
71. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239,
§ 7641(a), 103 Stat. 2106, 2379 (amending I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)); Hobbs, supra note
23, at 74–75.
72. Hobbs, supra note 23, at 75.
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intentions.73 All courts were now free to apply § 104(a)(2)’s
exclusion to nonphysical injuries.74 This judicial freedom led to
confusion in lower courts as to how to apply § 104(a)(2) to
nonphysical injuries, especially in the context of recovery for
employment discrimination.75 This confusion ultimately
compelled the Supreme Court to intercede.76
D. A Two-Part Test Emerges
In the 1990s, the U.S. Supreme Court decided two
employment discrimination cases, resulting in a two-part test for
damage awards to be excluded under § 104(a)(2).77 To exclude
damage awards under § 104(a)(2), a taxpayer must establish that
the “cause of action giving rise to the recovery [was] ‘based upon
tort or tort type rights’” and that the “damages were received ‘on
account of personal injuries or sickness.’”78 Subsequent
congressional and judicial action refined the Court’s two-part
test, but the framework remained applicable.79

73. See id. (“This was precisely the opposite of the intent of the House
provision . . . .”).
74. See id. (noting that courts were “free to apply § 104(a)(2) to nonphysical
injuries”).
75. See id. at 75–78 (noting that “courts struggled in determining the
applicability of § 104(a)(2) to employment discrimination recoveries” and
discussing the events leading up to United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992)).
76. See id. (noting that “courts struggled in determining the applicability of
§ 104(a)(2) to employment discrimination recoveries” and discussing the events
leading up to Burke).
77. See Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 336–37 (1995) (determining that
for a recovery to be excluded under § 104(a)(2), a taxpayer must establish that
the “cause of action giving rise to the recovery [was] ‘based upon tort or tort type
rights’” and that the “damages were received ‘on account of personal injuries or
sickness’”); United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 241 (1992) (determining that
damages received must redress tort or tort-like personal injury claims to be
excluded under § 104(a)(2)); see also Hobbs, supra note 23, at 81 (stating that,
after Schleier, a taxpayer must satisfy two separate requirements to exclude a
damage award under § 104(a)(2)).
78. Schleier, 515 U.S. at 336–37.
79. See Amos v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 2003-329, at 4 (2003) (finding that
subsequent congressional action merely imposed additional requirements to
Schleier’s two-part test, but did not otherwise alter Schleier’s framework).
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1. United States v. Burke

In 1992, the U.S Supreme Court decided United States v.
Burke.80 Burke held that the taxpayers’ backpay awards received
as settlement of their claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 196481 (Title VII) were not excludable from income under
§ 104(a)(2).82 The Court’s decision did not hinge on whether the
claims were physical or nonphysical, however.83 Instead, the
Court specifically addressed whether an award of back wages
redressed a “tort-like personal injury within the meaning of
§ 104(a)(2) and the applicable regulations.”84 Because Title VII
did not allow compensatory damages and limited the available
remedies to “backpay, injunctions, and other equitable relief,” the
Court concluded that Title VII did not redress “a tort-like
personal injury within the meaning of § 104(a)(2) and the
applicable regulations.”85 Before concluding that Title VII
backpay awards were not excludable from respondent’s gross
income under § 104(a)(2),86 however, the Court acknowledged a
few important precepts of both the Tax Code and § 104(a)(2)’s
exclusion.
The Court first noted that the Tax Code’s definition of gross
income “sweeps broadly”87 to include “all income from whatever

80. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 242 (1992) (holding that “the
backpay awards received by respondents in settlement of their Title VII claims
[were] not excludable from gross income as ‘damages received . . . on account of
personal injuries’ under § 104(a)(2)” (alteration in original)).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012).
82. Burke, 504 U.S. at 242.
83. See id. at 241 (finding that Title VII backpay awards did not redress a
“tort-like personal injury” and thus could not be excluded from gross income).
84. See id. (concluding that the award of back wages under a Title VII
claim did not redress tort-like personal injuries); see also I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)
(2006); 26 CFR § 1.104-1(c) (1991) (“The term ‘damages received (whether by
suit or agreement)’ means an amount received (other than workmen’s
compensation) through prosecution of a legal suit or action based upon tort or
tort type rights.”).
85. Burke, 504 U.S. at 241.
86. Id. at 241–42 (concluding that the award of back wages under a Title
VII claim did not redress tort or tort-like personal injuries and were thus not
excludable from gross income under § 104(a)(2)).
87. Id. at 233.
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source derived.”88 Further, the Court acknowledged Congress’s
intention to exert its full taxing power when enacting § 61(a).89
Also, the Court noted that after its decision in Glenshaw Glass, it
has interpreted any “accession to wealth” to be within the
definition of gross income.90 Although gross income includes any
accession to wealth, exclusions from gross income must be
“specifically enumerated elsewhere in the Code.”91 Additionally,
these specifically enumerated exclusions from gross income are
“narrowly construed.”92 Finally, the Court acknowledged that
although courts once interpreted the personal injury exclusion to
encompass only “physical” injuries, it was now well accepted that
the exclusion encompassed nonphysical injuries as well.93
2. Commissioner v. Schleier
The U.S. Supreme Court’s next contribution to § 104(a)(2)
came three years later when it decided Commissioner v.
Schleier.94 Similar to the issue addressed in Burke, the Court
considered whether § 104(a)(2) authorized the taxpayer to
exclude the amount received as settlement for his claims for both
backpay and liquidated damages under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) from his gross income.95 Half of the
taxpayer’s settlement was attributed to backpay and half to

88. Id. (quoting I.R.C. § 61(a) (2006)).
89. Id.
90. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S.
426, 431 (1955)).
91. Id.
92. See id. at 248 (Souter, J., concurring) (noting the “default rule of
statutory interpretation that exclusions from income must be narrowly
construed”).
93. See id. at 235 n.6 (majority opinion) (noting that the exclusion’s scope
had previously been limited to only physical injuries, but that it was now settled
that it extended to “nonphysical injuries to the individual”).
94. Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323 (1995) (holding that § 104(a)(2) did
not exclude respondent’s recovery for back wages under the ADEA).
95. See id. at 324–25 (“The question presented is whether
§ 104(a)(2) . . . authorizes a taxpayer to exclude from his gross income the
amount received in settlement of a claim for backpay and liquidated damages
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).”).
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liquidated damages.96 The Tax Court determined the entire
amount to be excludable, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The
Supreme Court, however, reversed, holding that § 104(a)(2) did
not exclude the taxpayer’s ADEA recovery.97
As in Burke, the Court emphasized the broadly sweeping
definition of gross income and the corollary that exclusions must
be construed narrowly.98 And also as it did in Burke, the Court
looked to the available remedies under the ADEA, noting that the
ADEA allowed for liquidated damages “only in cases of willful
violations” and that the ADEA did not permit a “separate
recovery of compensatory damages for pain and suffering or
emotional distress.”99 The Court, however, did not first analyze
the claim under Burke’s “tort or tort-type rights” standard for
excludability. Instead, the Court went on to determine whether
the settlement award was “on account of personal injuries.”100
The Court used injuries resulting from an automobile
accident as an example to illustrate its idea of what constituted a
“personal injury.”101 In the Court’s example, a taxpayer’s medical
expenses, lost wages, and pain, suffering, and emotional distress
would all be excludable under § 104(a)(2) as being on account of
personal injuries arising out of the automobile accident.102 The
Court compared backpay in the present case to lost wages
resulting from the hypothetical automobile accident.103 But unlike
the lost wages in the automobile accident example, the Court
96. See id. at 326 (“Half of respondent’s award was attributed to ‘backpay’
and half to ‘liquidated damages.’”).
97. See id. at 327 (stating that the Tax Court and the Fifth Circuit allowed
the amount to be excluded, but reversing those decisions).
98. See id. at 327–28 (noting the “sweeping scope” of § 61(a) and that
exclusions from income are narrowly construed).
99. Id. at 326.
100. See id. at 328–32 (determining whether the backpay portion or the
liquidated damages portion of respondent’s settlement was “on account of
personal injuries”).
101. See id. at 328–31 (noting potential claims and injuries arising out of a
hypothetical car crash to illustrate an example of a personal injury).
102. See id. at 329–30 (determining that all recoveries associated with
injuries arising out an automobile accident would be excludable under
§ 104(a)(2)).
103. See id. at 330–31 (comparing respondent’s recovery of back wages to
recovery for lost wages that hypothetically resulted from injuries sustained in a
car accident).
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determined that the taxpayer’s backpay was not excludable.104
The Court reasoned that the taxpayer’s back wages were not
excludable because any personal injury caused by the age
discrimination was not in any way linked to the loss of wages.105
Thus, age discrimination directly causes two distinct injuries,
only one of which is a personal injury.106 First, the employer’s
conduct directly causes lost wages. Second, the tortious conduct
often causes a nonphysical personal injury. The lost wages,
however, do not flow from the personal injury and therefore do
not meet § 104(a)(2)’s on account of requirement.
After the Court concluded that the recovery of back wages
under the ADEA was not on account of any personal injury, it
then addressed respondent’s argument that § 104(a)(2) excluded
the liquidated damages portion of the award.107 The Court
concluded that the liquidated damages also could not be
excluded.108 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority,
acknowledged that the liquidated damages might have come
within § 104(a)(2)’s exclusion had that been Congress’s
intention.109 Justice Stevens, however, found nothing to indicate
that Congress intended the ADEA’s liquidated damages to
compensate “personal rather than economic” injuries.110 Instead,
104. See id. (“[Section] 104(a)(2) does not permit the exclusion of
respondent’s back wages because the recovery of back wages was not ‘on account
of’ any personal injury and because no personal injury affected the amount of
back wages recovered.”).
105. See id. at 330 (“In age discrimination, the discrimination causes both
personal injury and loss of wages, but neither is linked to the other.”); see also
Hobbs, supra note 23, at 81–82 (stating that Justice Stevens’s language, when
writing for the majority in determining that a recovery under the ADEA was not
a personal injury, “defie[d] logic”).
106. Cf. Banaitis v. Comm’r, 340 F.3d 1074, 1080 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining
that employment discrimination causes two distinct injuries).
107. See Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 331–32 (1995) (addressing the
potential excludability of respondent’s liquidated damages portion).
108. See id. (concluding that “liquidated damages under the ADEA, like
back wages under the ADEA, are not received ‘on account of personal injury or
sickness’”).
109. See id. at 331 (determining that the Court’s previous observation—that
the liquidated damages authorized by the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
(FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219, may compensate for some “obscure” injuries—did
not necessarily mean that Congress intended the ADEA’s liquidated damages
provision to be “personal rather than economic”).
110. Id.
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Justice Stevens found the ADEA’s liquidated damages provision
to be punitive in nature.111 Accordingly, he concluded that the
recovery’s liquidated damages portion, along with the portion
attributed to backpay, was not received “on account of personal
injury of sickness.”112
Next, the Court examined whether the taxpayer’s ADEA
recovery was “based upon ‘tort or tort type rights’ as that term
was construed in Burke.”113 Again the Court looked to the ADEA’s
remedial scheme, declared that the jury trial and liquidated
damages provisions were not sufficient to bring an ADEA
recovery within the ambit of § 104(a)(2), and concluded that “a
recovery under the ADEA [was] not one that is ‘based upon tort
or tort type rights.’”114
Throughout its opinion, the Court seemed uncomfortable
applying § 104(a)(2) to nonphysical injuries.115 But the Court did
not go so far as to provide a rule limiting the exclusion to physical
injuries.116 Instead, Justice Stevens articulated a two-part test for
excludability under § 104(a)(2).117 First, a taxpayer must
“demonstrate that the underlying cause of action giving rise to
the recovery is ‘based upon tort or tort type rights.’”118 Second, the
taxpayer must “show that the damages were received on ‘account
of personal injuries or sickness.’”119 For a recovery to be
excludable, a taxpayer must satisfy Schleier’s two independent
requirements.120
111. Id.
112. Id. at 332.
113. See id. at 334–36 (addressing respondent’s argument that the recovery
was excludable under Burke).
114. See id. at 335–36 (determining that neither the ADEA’s jury trial
provision nor its liquidated damages provision were sufficient to bring a
recovery under the ADEA within the § 104(a)(2) exclusion).
115. See Hobbs, supra note 23, at 82 (“The Supreme Court’s decisions in
Burke and Schleier clearly exhibited the Court’s discomfort in applying
§ 104(a)(2) in a nonphysical context.”).
116. See id. (noting that the Court did not “articulate a rule limiting
§ 104(a)(2) to physical injuries”).
117. See Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 337 (1995) (articulating a twopart test).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See id. at 336–37 (stating the “two independent requirements that a
taxpayer must meet before a recovery may be excluded under § 104(a)(2)”).
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Since Schleier, many courts have conceded that a recovery
was “based upon tort or tort type rights,”121 and Treasury has
recently finalized regulations eliminating the requirement
entirely.122 Instead, courts have focused on whether the damages
were received on account of a personal injury.123 Schleier,
however, provided little detail on when a recovery is on account of
a personal injury.124 After Schleier, courts added more definition
to the on account of requirement,125 but Schleier’s framework
remained the standard.126
III. The Courts Refine § 104(a)(2)’s “On Account Of” Requirement
In O’Gilvie v. United States,127 the U.S. Supreme Court
addressed whether § 104(a)(2) excluded punitive damages, and
provided a narrow interpretation of § 104(a)(2)’s on account of
requirement.128 The Court concluded that the petitioner’s
punitive damages were not received on account of personal

121. See, e.g., Domeny v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2010-9, at 3 (2010)
(concluding summarily that the taxpayer’s action was based upon tort or torttype rights).
122. See, Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (as amended in 2012) (excluding from gross
income damages “on account of personal injuries or sickness”).
123. See e.g., O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 82–83 (1996) (holding
that “on account of” required a stronger causal connection than “but for,” and
that only “damages that were awarded by reason of, or because of, the personal
injuries” could be excluded under § 104(a)(2)).
124. See Hobbs, supra note 23, at 81 (“The Court did not provide a test for
determining when an amount was received for personal injury, in effect saying,
we will know it when we see it.”).
125. See infra Part III (discussing court opinions interpreting “on account
of”).
126. See Amos v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 2003-329, at 4 (2003) (“The 1996
amendment does not otherwise change the requirements of section 104(a)(2) or
the analysis set forth in Commissioner v. Schleier; it imposes an additional
requirement for an amount to qualify for exclusion from gross income under
that section.” (citation omitted)).
127. O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 82–83 (1996) (holding that “on
account of” required a stronger causal connection than “but for,” and that only
“damages that were awarded by reason of, or because of, the personal injuries”
could be excluded under § 104(a)(2)).
128. See id. at 82 (resolving a circuit split on the proper interpretation of
Schleier’s “on account of” requirement).
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injuries and thus not excludable under § 104(a)(2).129 The Court
rejected the petitioner’s argument that § 104(a)(2) only required a
“but for” connection between the damages received and the
underlying personal injury.130 Instead, the Court agreed with the
Government that § 104(a)(2) was “applicable only to those
personal injury lawsuit damages that were awarded by reason of,
or because of” the underlying personal injury.131
Although O’Gilvie did not explicitly determine what damages
fell within its interpretation, the Court narrowly interpreted
§ 104(a)(2)’s on account of requirement132 in accord with
customary Tax Code interpretation.133 After O’Gilvie, lower courts
continued to refine § 104(a)(2)’s requirement.134
A. The “Direct Causal Link”
In Banaitis v. Commissioner,135 the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit considered whether a taxpayer’s economic and
punitive damages recovered in his wrongful termination suit fell
within § 104(a)(2)’s exclusion.136 In Banaitis, the taxpayer
received $8,728,599 as settlement for his various claims against
129. See id. at 81 (“We conclude that the punitive damages here were not
received ‘on account of’ personal injuries; hence [section 104(a)(2)] does not
apply, and the damages are taxable.”).
130. See id. at 82 (rejecting the petitioner’s argument for “but for”
causation).
131. See id. at 83 (agreeing with the Government’s interpretation of the
statute).
132. See id. at 82 (rejecting petitioner’s broad reading of § 104(a)(2)’s “on
account of” requirement).
133. See United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 248 (1992) (Souter, J.,
concurring in judgment) (noting the “default rule of statutory interpretation
that exclusions from income must be narrowly construed”).
134. See infra Part III.A (discussing the lower courts’ interpretation of
§ 104(a)(2)’s “on account of” requirement).
135. Banaitis v. Comm’r, 340 F.3d 1074, 1080–81 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding
that the taxpayer’s economic and punitive damages recovered in his wrongful
termination suit against his former employer were not “on account of” personal
injuries and thus not excludable under § 104(a)(2)), rev’d on other grounds,
Comm’r v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426 (2005).
136. See id. at 1079–81 (considering whether a taxpayer’s economic and
punitive damages recovered in his wrongful termination suit fell within
§ 104(a)(2)’s exclusion).
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his former employer.137 The taxpayer claimed that § 104(a)(2)
excluded the full amount,138 but the Ninth Circuit concluded that
the entire amount was taxable.139
Banaitis alleged that his employers’ conduct resulted in a
number of physical injuries.140 Those injuries included
“headaches, insomnia, gastrointestinal disorders, bleeding gums,
and various orthopedic problems.”141 Addressing whether the
award satisfied the “on account of” requirement, the court stated
that to satisfy § 104(a)(2)’s second prong, the taxpayer must show
the “damage award [was] more than only proximately caused by
[his employer’s] tortious conduct; it must also be directly causally
related to [his] personal injuries.”142 Further, the court stated
that the on account of requirement “can only be satisfied if there
is ‘a direct causal link’ between the damages and the personal
injuries sustained.”143 The court noted that in the ordinary
personal injury tort action, it is relatively easy to discern what
damages are on account of a personal injury:
The tortious act causes personal injuries which, in turn, cause
further damages, such as economic loss due to physical
inability to work. Thus, in the paradigmatic personal injury
case, both non-pecuniary damages (such as pain and suffering)
and economic damages (such as wage loss, diminished work
capacity, etc.) may be excluded from gross income because the
losses are “on account of” personal injury.144

When damages arise from “economic or commercial tort”
actions, on the other hand, it is more difficult to discern what
damages are on account of personal injuries.145 Put another way,
137. See id. at 1078 (noting the taxpayer’s settlement recovery).
138. See id. (noting the taxpayer’s argument that § 104(a)(2) excluded his
award).
139. See id. at 1080–81 (concluding that the taxpayer’s award was fully
taxable).
140. See id. at 1076 (“Troubled by his employment situation, Banaitis
apparently suffered a host of physical maladies.”).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1080 (citing Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 329–30 (1995)).
143. Id. (citing Fabry v. Comm’r, 223 F.3d 1261, 1270 (11th Cir. 2000)).
144. Id.
145. See id. (noting that “economic or commercial tort actions present a
different circumstance,” and that “the ‘direct causal link’ question requires a
fact-specific analysis”).
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it is more difficult to establish the requisite “direct causal link”
between the damages received and the personal injuries
sustained.146 The Ninth Circuit stated that “[i]n such economic or
commercial tort cases, economic damages are often caused solely
by the tortious action itself, rather than as a consequence of
personal injury.”147 The court gave the typical wrongful discharge
lawsuit as an example, stating “wage loss is typically caused by
the tortious employment termination, not by any physical injury
that may also have been caused by the wrongful discharge.”148
The court determined that Banaitis’s alleged physical injuries
“did not cause his wage loss,” and that his damages “were not
causally related to [his] alleged personal injuries.”149 This
analysis is nearly identical to Schleier’s analysis in which the
Supreme Court determined that age discrimination caused both
lost wages and a personal injury, but that the two were not
linked.150 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
§ 104(a)(2)’s exclusion did not apply and that Banaitis’s damages
award was fully taxable.151
Banaitis and O’Gilvie illustrate that § 104(a)(2) excludes only
damages directly caused by a “personal injury or sickness.”
Notably, the two cases addressed § 104(a)(2)’s required causal
connection between the taxpayer’s damages received and an

146. See id. (noting that “economic or commercial tort actions present a
different circumstance,” and that “the ‘direct causal link’ question requires a
fact-specific analysis”).
147. Id.
148. Id.; cf. Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 330 (1995) (“In age
discrimination, the discrimination causes both personal injury and loss of
wages, but neither is linked to the other.”).
149. See Banaitis v. Comm’r, 340 F.3d 1074, 1080 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The
personal injuries Banaitis alleges (e.g., headaches, insomnia, gastrointestinal
disorders, bleeding gums, and back aches) did not cause his wage loss.”); see also
Banaitis v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 2002-5, at 4 (2002) (determining that Banaitis’s
economic damages were not received “on account of” his alleged personal
injuries because “he was not forced to leave his job because of those injuries”).
150. Supra note 105 and accompanying text; see also Schleier, 515 U.S. at
330 (“In age discrimination, the discrimination causes both personal injury and
loss of wages, but neither is linked to the other.”).
151. See Banaitis, 340 F.3d at 1081 (affirming that § 104(a)(2)’s exclusion
did not apply and that Banaitis’s damage awards “should have been included in
his gross income”).
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already-established personal injury.152 When Congress amended
§ 104(a)(2)’s exclusion to add a “physical” requirement,153
establishing § 104(a)(2)’s qualifying “personal physical injury or
physical sickness” became a much more difficult task.
IV. The Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996
The Small Business Job Protection Act154 (the 1996 Act)
became law on August 20, 1996.155 Section 1605 of the 1996 Act
amended § 104(a).156 Section 1605(a) specifically amended
§ 104(a)(2), providing that gross income does not include the
“amount of any damages (other than punitive damages) received
(whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or as
periodic payments) on account of personal physical injuries or
physical sickness.”157 Section 1605(b) also amended § 104(a) to
expressly provide that “emotional distress shall not be treated as
a physical injury or physical sickness” for purposes of
§ 104(a)(2).158
While prohibiting emotional distress from constituting a
physical injury or physical sickness, § 104(a) provides that the
prohibition does not apply to “damages not in excess of the
amount paid for medical care (described in subparagraph (A) or
(B) Section 213(d)(1)) attributable to emotional distress.”159
152. See supra Parts III.A–B (discussing O’Gilvie and Banaitis).
153. See Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188,
§ 1605, 110 Stat. 1755, 1838 (adding the word “physical” to § 104(a)(2)’s
exclusion).
154. Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110
Stat. 1755.
155. See Hobbs, supra note 23, at 82 (“On August 20, 1996, President
Clinton signed into law the Small Business Job Protection Act.”).
156. See Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188,
§ 1605, 110 Stat. 1755, 1838 (providing amendments to § 104(a)).
157. Id. § 1605(a), 110 Stat. at 1838 (emphasis added).
158. See id. § 1605(b), 110 Stat. at 1838 (“Section 104(a) is amended by
striking the last sentence and inserting the following sentence: ‘For purposes of
paragraph (2), emotional distress shall not be treated as a physical injury or
physical sickness.’”).
159. See I.R.C. § 104(a) (2006) (“The preceding sentence shall not apply to an
amount of damages not in excess of the amount paid for medical care (described
in subparagraph (A) or (B) of section 213(d)(1)) attributable to emotional
distress.”).
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Section 213(d)(1)(A) defines “medical care” to include amounts
paid “for the diagnoses, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention
of disease, or for the purpose of affecting any structure or
function of the body.”160 And § 213(d)(1)(B) provides that “medical
care” includes amounts paid “for transportation primarily for and
essential to medical care referred to in subparagraph (A).”161
Presumably, this language permits a taxpayer to exclude
damages received solely for emotional distress from gross income
under § 104(a)(2) up to the amount the damages compensate for
“medical care” expenses otherwise deductible under § 213(d)(1)(A)
or (B).162
In the 1996 Act’s legislative history (the House Report),
Congress noted courts’ prior broad extensions of § 104(a)(2) to
nonphysical personal injuries and reiterated that all punitive
damages should be included in income.163 Congress did provide,
however, that punitive damages received in a wrongful death suit
may be excluded from gross income if applicable state law
provides that “only punitive damages may be awarded in a
wrongful death action.”164
Most importantly, under the heading “Include in income
damage recoveries for nonphysical injuries,”165 the House Report
provided guidance on when damages would be excludable under
§ 104(a)(2), as amended. The House Report stated that “[i]f an
action has its origin in a physical injury or physical sickness, then
all damages (other than punitive damages) that flow therefrom
are treated as payments received on account of physical injury or
physical sickness whether or not the recipient of the damages is
the injured party.”166 Congress’s language indicated that a
taxpayer’s action must first have its “origin” in a physical injury
160. Id. § 213(d)(1)(A).
161. Id. § 213(d)(1)(B).
162. Id. § 213(d)(1)(A)–(B).
163. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-737, at 300–01, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1677, 1792–93 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT] (noting that courts have interpreted
the exclusion broadly “to cover awards for personal injury that do not relate to a
physical injury or sickness” and reiterating that punitive damages should be
included in income).
164. Id. at 301.
165. Id.
166. Id. (emphasis added).
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or physical sickness before proceeding to determine whether an
amount is received “on account of a personal physical injury or
physical sickness.”167
The House Report expressly stated, however, that emotional
distress, including symptoms thereof, is not considered a physical
injury or physical sickness for purposes of the § 104(a)(2)’s
exclusion.168 As an example, the House Report provided that “the
exclusion from gross income does not apply to any damages
received . . . based on a claim of employment discrimination or
injury to reputation accompanied by a claim of emotional
distress.”169 When an action has its origin in a physical injury or
physical sickness, however, and the physical injury or physical
sickness causes the taxpayer to suffer emotional distress,
§ 104(a)(2) does exclude damages allocated to such emotional
distress. The House Report explained that “[b]ecause all damages
received on account of physical injury or physical sickness are
excludable from gross income, the exclusion from gross income
applies to any damages received based on a claim of emotional
distress that is attributable to a physical injury or physical
sickness.”170 Lastly, the House Report stated that the gross
income exclusion applies to medical care expenses attributable to
emotional distress,171 affirming the presumption created by
§ 104(a)’s text.172

167. See Robert W. Wood, Waiting to Exhale: Murphy Part Deux and Taxing
Damage Awards, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY, at 5 (Feb. 7–8, 2008) (“Congress
require[s] that the action have its origin in a physical injury or sickness.”).
168. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 163, at 301 (stating that the House bill
“specifically provides that emotional distress is not considered a physical injury
or physical sickness” and also that the term emotional distress includes
symptoms resulting from such emotional distress).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See id. (“[T]he exclusion from gross income specifically applies to the
amount of damages received that is not in excess of the amount paid for medical
care attributable to emotional distress.”).
172. See supra notes 159–62 and accompanying text.
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V. Section 104(a)(2)’s Exclusion After the 1996 Act

Because Congress prohibited emotional distress and its
resulting symptoms from being excluded from gross income under
§ 104(a)(2), after the 1996 Act, taxpayers faced the additional
burden of establishing that their personal injury or sickness was
physical rather than emotional. Courts, however, continued to
only apply Schleier’s two-part test to § 104(a)(2)’s exclusion,173
failing to accommodate the added physical requirement. Although
their reasoning left open the potential for misapplication, the
circuit courts, amidst allegations of physical injuries or physical
sicknesses, refused to apply § 104(a)(2)’s exclusion to taxpayers’
recoveries for nonphysical or emotional injuries.174 Perhaps the
most notable—or infamous—case to do so is one the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit decided in 2007.175
A. The Circuits Reach the Right Outcome
In Murphy v. Internal Revenue Service,176 after determining
the taxpayer’s compensatory damages were not income within the
Sixteenth Amendment’s meaning, then sua sponte vacating its
judgment and rehearing the case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit held that Murphy’s award could not be excluded
under § 104(a)(2).177 Additionally, the court held that Murphy’s
173. See Amos v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 2003-329, at 4 (2003) (“The 1996
amendment does not otherwise change the requirements of section 104(a)(2) or
the analysis set forth in Commissioner v. Schleier; it imposes an additional
requirement for an amount to qualify for exclusion from gross income under
that section.” (citation omitted)).
174. See infra Part V.A (discussing circuit court cases following the 1996
Act).
175. See generally Murphy v. Internal Revenue Serv., 493 F.3d 170 (D.C.
Cir. 2007).
176. See Murphy v. Internal Revenue Serv., 493 F.3d 170, 171 (D.C. Cir.
2007) (holding that the taxpayer’s “compensation was not ‘received . . . on
account of personal physical injures’ excludable from gross income under
§ 104(a)(2)” and that § 61(a)’s gross income definition included the taxpayer’s
award (alteration in original)).
177. See id. (“We hold, first, that Murphy’s compensation was not
‘received . . . on account of personal physical injuries’ excludable from gross
income under § 104(a)(2).” (alteration in original)).
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compensation fell within § 61(a)’s definition of income178 and
admitted that there is no constitutional impediment to taxing
personal injury awards.179
Murphy alleged that her former employer violated various
whistleblower statutes and “blacklisted” her.180 After a hearing
before the Secretary of Labor, an Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) recommended compensatory damages totaling $70,000 to
Murphy.181 The Department of Labor Administrative Review
Board (Board) affirmed the ALJ’s findings and granted the
award.182 $45,000 of the damages were allocated to “‘past and
future emotional distress’” and $25,000 of the damages were
allocated to “‘injury to [Murphy’s] vocational reputation.’”183 The
court noted that “[n]one of the award was for lost wages or
diminished earning capacity.”184 After including the full amount
in her gross income on her 2000 tax return, Murphy filed an
amended return seeking a $20,665 refund.185 She argued, among
other things, that § 104(a)(2) excluded her award from her gross
income.186 This time the D.C. Circuit rejected Murphy’s argument
in full.187
Before the ALJ, Murphy submitted evidence that she
suffered both “somatic”—relating to, or affecting, the body188—
and “emotional” injuries.189 Her injuries included “bruxism,” or
178. See id. at 180 (holding that gross income under § 61(a) included
Murphy’s compensatory award).
179. See id. at 173 (agreeing with the Government’s argument that there is
no constitutional problem with taxing personal injury awards).
180. See id. at 171–72 (describing the taxpayer’s original allegations).
181. See id. at 172 (“[T]he ALJ recommended compensatory damages
totaling $70,000.”).
182. See id. (“In 1999 the Department of Labor Administrative Review
Board affirmed the ALJ’s findings and recommendations.”).
183. See id. (describing the damages allocation) (alteration in original).
184. Id.
185. See id. (stating that Ms. Murphy originally included the amount in her
gross income and then filed an amended return).
186. See id. at 171 (noting Ms. Murphy’s arguments that her award should
be excluded or that taxing her award was unconstitutional).
187. See id. (“We reject Murphy’s argument in all aspects.”).
188. See id. at 174 (defining “somatic”).
189. See id. at 172 (“A psychologist testified that Murphy had sustained both
‘somatic’ and ‘emotional’ injuries . . . .”).
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teeth grinding, and “‘anxiety attacks, shortness of breath, and
dizziness.’”190 Murphy argued that § 104(a)(2)’s exclusion did not
require a “physical stimulus” and that “‘substantial physical
problems caused by emotional distress’” should be considered a
physical injury or physical sickness.191 The D.C. Circuit did not
agree, finding that § 104(a)(2)’s exclusion did not apply to
Murphy’s award.192
The court first cited § 104(a)(2)’s post-amble, which states
that “‘emotional distress shall not be treated as a physical injury
or physical sickness,’”193 then addressed the Government’s
contentions.194 The Government argued that O’Gilvie dictated a
“strong causal connection” between Murphy’s received damages
and her alleged physical injuries.195 This meant Murphy had to
demonstrate that her damages were awarded “because of” her
physical injuries, which the Government claimed she failed to
do.196 Further, based on the Board’s failure to reference any of
Murphy’s physical injuries—especially her bruxism—the
Government argued that “‘there was no direct causal link
between the damages award at issue and [Murphy’s] bruxism.’”197
The court agreed that a strong causal link was required, finding
that O’Gilvie’s analysis of § 104(a)(2)’s on account of requirement
remained controlling after the 1996 Act.198
190. See id. (noting Murphy’s alleged injuries).
191. See id. at 175 (noting Murphy’s contentions as to why her award should
be excluded from her gross income by § 104(a)(2)).
192. See id. at 176 (concluding that § 104(a)(2) did “not permit Murphy to
exclude her award from gross income”).
193. See id. at 174 (“[F]or purposes of this exclusion, ‘emotional distress
shall not be treated as a physical injury or physical sickness.’” (citing
I.R.C. § 104(a) (2006))).
194. See id. at 175 (addressing the Government’s arguments as to why
Murphy’s award should not be excluded).
195. See id. (noting the Government’s argument that the Supreme Court in
O’Gilvie read § 104(a)(2)’s “on account of” language to require a “strong causal
connection”).
196. See id. (“The Government therefore concludes Murphy must
demonstrate she was awarded damages ‘because of’ her physical injuries, which
the Government claims she has failed to do.”).
197. See id. (stating that the Board made no reference in its award to
Murphy’s physical injuries and noting the Government’s argument) (alteration
in original).
198. See id. at 176 (finding that O’Gilvie’s analysis of the phrase “on account
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Next, the court conceded that Murphy suffered “physical
manifestations of emotional distress,” and that the ALJ may have
at best “considered her physical injuries indicative of the severity
of [her] emotional distress.”199 The court concluded, however, that
because “her physical injuries themselves were not the reason for
the award,” Murphy’s damages were not awarded “because of” her
physical injuries.200 Thus, Murphy could not use § 104(a)(2) to
exclude her award from gross income.201
Other circuits have also refused to apply § 104(a)(2)’s
exclusion to damage awards in which the taxpayers alleged to
have suffered physical injuries.202 The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit, in Johnson v. United States,203 refused to
exclude any portion of a taxpayer’s award under the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA)204 for being unlawfully terminated.205
The taxpayer suffered physical injuries while working as a
juvenile guard for the State of Colorado’s Department of
Corrections and attempting to restrain an inmate.206 After the
injuries, the taxpayer was unable to perform the duties of a
juvenile guard.207 Instead of accommodating him under the ADA
with another job he could perform, Colorado terminated his
of” remained controlling).
199. See id. (acknowledging that Murphy suffered physical injuries and that
the ALJ may have considered them when recommending her award) (emphasis
added).
200. See id. (concluding that Murphy’s “damages were not ‘awarded by
reason of, or because of, . . . [physical] personal injuries’” (alterations in original)
(citing O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 83 (1996))).
201. See id. (“Therefore, § 104(a)(2) does not permit Murphy to exclude her
award from gross income.”).
202. See generally, e.g., Stadnyk v. Comm’r, 367 F. App’x 586 (6th Cir. 2010);
Lindsey v. Comm’r, 422 F.3d 684 (8th Cir. 2005); Johnson v. United States, 76
F. App’x 873 (10th Cir. 2003).
203. Johnson v. United States, 76 F. App’x 873, 877–78 (10th Cir. 2003)
(holding that § 104(a)(2) did not exclude the taxpayer’s ADA damages award for
front and back pay from his gross income).
204. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2006).
205. See Johnson, 76 F. App’x at 877–78 (concluding that none of the
taxpayer’s damages could be excluded from his gross income under § 104(a)(2)).
206. See id. at 874 (noting that the taxpayer received physical injuries while
attempting to restrain a juvenile inmate).
207. See id. (noting that the taxpayer’s injuries prohibited him from
fulfilling his duties as a guard).
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employment.208 He sued the State of Colorado in state court and a
jury returned a verdict in his favor.209
The taxpayer did not challenge the taxability of the portion of
the jury verdict allocated to “emotional distress, pain, suffering
and mental anguish.”210 Instead, the taxpayer sought to exclude
the $293,400 amount awarded for back and front pay from his
gross income.211 He argued that § 104(a)(2) excluded the damages
because his physical injuries led to his unlawful termination.212
The court refused to apply § 104(a)(2)’s exclusion to the award,
however, reasoning that because the unlawful termination caused
the loss of income, and not any alleged personal physical
injury,213 the damages were not received “on account of personal
physical injuries.”214
When faced with similar issues, the Sixth and Eighth
Circuits reached results similar to the Tenth Circuit’s.215 In
Stadnyk v. Commissioner,216 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
208. See id. (noting that Colorado terminated his employment).
209. See id. (noting that the taxpayer sued).
210. See id. (noting that the taxpayer only sought a refund for the “tax
liability on the back and front pay portions of the award”).
211. See id.
212. See id. at 876 (noting the taxpayer’s argument that § 104(a)(2) excluded
his award because his physical injuries led to his unlawful termination).
213. See id. at 877 (“[T]he actual cause of the loss of income and the ADA
action was the unlawful termination, not the personal physical injury.”); cf.
Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 330 (1995) (“In age discrimination, the
discrimination causes both personal injury and loss of wages, but neither is
linked to the other.”); Banaitis v. Comm’r, 340 F.3d 1074, 1080 (9th Cir. 2003)
(explaining that wage loss is directly caused by the employment discrimination,
not by any physical injury).
214. See Johnson v. United States, 76 F. App’x 873, 877–78 (10th Cir. 2003)
(concluding that the front and back pay damages lacked a “direct causal link” to
the taxpayer’s physical injuries and were therefore not received “on account of”
such injuries).
215. See Stadnyk v. Comm’r, 367 F. App’x 586, 594 (6th Cir. 2010)
(concluding that the taxpayer’s award for false imprisonment claims could not
be excluded from gross income under § 104(a)(2) because there was no “causal
connection between any physical injury and the settlement award”); Lindsey v.
Comm’r, 422 F.3d 684, 686, 689 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that § 104(a)(2) did not
exclude the taxpayer’s settlement for “claims for tortious interference with
contracts, for personal injury including injury to [his] personal and professional
reputation and emotional distress, [and] humiliation and embarrassment”).
216. See Stadnyk v. Comm’r, 367 F. App’x 586, 594 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding
that the taxpayer’s award for false imprisonment claims could not be excluded
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Sixth Circuit found § 104(a)(2)’s exclusion inapplicable to a
$49,000 settlement award for claims relating to false
imprisonment.217 Although the taxpayer had testified she
suffered no physical injuries resulting from her arrest and
detention, and nothing in the record suggested a physical injury,
she nonetheless argued that her physical restraint alone
constituted a personal physical injury.218 The court disagreed.219
The Sixth Circuit determined that false imprisonment did not
necessarily involve a physical injury,220 and concluded there was
no “direct causal link” between any other alleged physical injures
and the settlement award.221
In Lindsey v. Commissioner,222 the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s denial of § 104(a)(2)’s
exclusion to the taxpayer’s (Lindsey) $2 million settlement for
claims against the taxpayer’s former employer.223 Lindsey’s
claims included “tortious interference with contracts, . . . personal
injury including injury to [his] personal and professional
reputation and emotional distress, [and] humiliation and
embarrassment.”224 Lindsey alleged that he suffered physical
stress-related symptoms including hypertension, periodic
from gross income under § 104(a)(2) because there was no “causal connection
between any physical injury and the settlement award”).
217. See id. at 594 (finding § 104(a)(2) inapplicable to the taxpayer’s
settlement award).
218. See id. at 592–93 (noting that “Mrs. Stadnyk testified that she did not
suffer any physical injury as a result of her arrest and detention,” that
“[n]othing in the record suggests that Mrs. Stadnyk suffered physical, as
opposed to emotional, injuries,” and that she argued that her physical restraint
alone constituted a physical injury).
219. See id. at 593 (determining that a false imprisonment victim is not
necessarily physically injured).
220. See id.
221. See id. at 594 (“Petitioners have failed to offer any concrete evidence
demonstrating a causal connection between any physical injury and the
settlement award.”).
222. Lindsey v. Comm’r, 422 F.3d 684, 686, 689 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that
§ 104(a)(2) did not exclude the taxpayer’s settlement for “claims for tortious
interference with contracts, for personal injury including injury to [his] personal
and professional reputation and emotional distress, [and] humiliation and
embarrassment”).
223. See id. (“Therefore, the tax court properly denied the exclusion.”).
224. Id. at 685.
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impotency, insomnia, fatigue, occasional indigestion, and urinary
incontinence.225 Before the Eighth Circuit, Lindsey argued that
the Tax Court erroneously concluded that § 104(a)(2) did not
apply to any portion of the award.226
In the Tax Court opinion under review, the court looked both
to the settlement’s terms and the payor’s intent when analyzing
whether § 104(a)(2) excluded Lindsey’s settlement.227 First, the
Tax Court stated that Congress explicitly excluded “emotional
distress and related injuries” from the “definition of physical
injuries or physical sickness.”228 The court then analyzed the
settlement’s terms, which simply reiterated Lindsey’s claims
against his employer.229 The court found that “[i]njury to
reputation, humiliation, and embarrassment are akin to
emotional distress” and that “tortious interference with contracts
is an economic injury, not a physical injury.”230 Accordingly, the
court found that § 104(a)(2) did not exclude damages received on
account of such claims.231
Next, the court considered whether Lindsey’s alleged
physical injuries served as the basis for any portion of the
settlement agreement.232 To do this, the court analyzed the intent
of the payor.233 Lindsey’s physician testified that he suffered
physical manifestations of stress, including hypertension, fatigue,
occasional indigestion, and insomnia.234 Lindsey’s physician
further testified that Lindsey’s hypertension could lead to
“strokes, heart attacks, and kidney disease.”235 The court stated
225. See id. at 688 (noting Lindsey’s alleged physical symptoms).
226. See id. at 687 (“Lindsey[ ] also contend[s] the Tax Court erred in finding
the physical sickness Lindsey suffered was a type not excludable under
I.R.C. § 104(a)(2).”).
227. See Lindsey v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 2004-113, at 5–6 (analyzing the
settlement’s terms and discerning the payor’s intent).
228. Id. at 5.
229. See id. (analyzing the settlement’s terms).
230. Id.
231. See id. (finding that § 104(a)(2) does not exclude damages received on
account of such claims).
232. See id. at 5–6 (considering whether any portion of the settlement was
intended to compensate Lindsey’s physical injuries).
233. See id. (analyzing the intent of the payor).
234. See id. at 5 (excerpting the physician’s testimony).
235. Id.
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that Congress intended Lindsey’s injuries to be “within the
definition of emotional distress,” citing the House Report’s
statement that emotional distress included symptoms.236 Finally,
the court found that even if Lindsey had suffered a “personal
physical injury within the meaning of section 104(a)(2), such
injury could not have been the basis for settlement” because there
was no evidence that Lindsey communicated such injuries to the
payor.237
On review, the Eighth Circuit mostly confirmed the Tax
Court’s findings and reasoning.238 Notably, though, the Eighth
Circuit implied that § 104(a)(2) might have excluded Lindsey’s
settlement had he done two things.239 First, the court noted the
importance of Lindsey’s failure to make the payor aware of his
physical injury or physical sickness.240 Second, the court stated
that Lindsey failed to meet the on account of requirement
because he did not demonstrate “what percentage of the
settlement damages [was] allocable to physical injury or physical
sickness,” and because the record’s evidence failed to do the
same.241 The Eighth Circuit’s implications provide a blueprint for
a taxpayer to exclude physical symptoms of emotional distress if
his award is not expressly allocated to nonphysical or emotional
injuries.
Without focusing on whether the taxpayer’s action against
the defendant had its origin in a physical injury or physical
sickness, the circuit courts still refused to apply § 104(a)(2)’s
exclusion amidst allegations of physical injuries. This result was
236. See id. (noting that Lindsey’s injuries fell “within the definition of
emotional distress” and citing the House Report).
237. See id. at 6 (“Even if petitioner had suffered a personal physical injury
within the meaning of section 104(a)(2), such injury could not have been the
basis for settlement because, as the parties stipulated, petitioner did not
communicate any physical injury to [the payor] during the settlement
negotiations.”).
238. See Lindsey v. Comm’r, 422 F.3d 684, 689 (8th Cir. 2005) (“We affirm
the well-reasoned decision of the Tax Court.”).
239. See id. at 688–89 (implying that § 104(a)(2) might have excluded
Lindsey’s award had he made the defendant aware of the injuries and been able
to prove that a portion of the settlement was allocated to such injuries).
240. See id. (noting the importance of Lindsey’s failure to communicate his
physical injuries to the defendant).
241. Id. at 689.
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possible because the damages at issue were expressly allocated to
nonphysical injuries. Because of this allocation, the taxpayers
were unable to prove that any portion of their award was
intended to compensate their alleged physical injury. Thus,
focusing on whether the received damages were “on account of a
personal physical injury or sickness” was sufficient to reach the
right outcome. As three conflicting Tax Court cases indicate, the
correct result is not as readily ascertainable when the damages
are not so neatly allocated.242
VI. The Tax Court Reaches Conflicting Results
A. Sanford v. Commissioner
In 2008, the U.S. Tax Court decided Sanford v.
Commissioner.243 Sanford held that § 104(a)(2) did not exclude
the taxpayer’s damages received from a legal action against her
employer
for
employment
discrimination
and
sexual
harassment.244 The taxpayer filed complaints with the U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) against her
employer, the U.S. Postal Service (USPS).245 She alleged that the
USPS discriminated against her and that “she was retaliated
against for previously participating in EEOC activity.”246

242. Compare Sanford v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2008-158, at 1 (2008) (holding
that § 104(a)(2) did not exclude the taxpayer’s damages received from a legal
action against her employer for employment discrimination and sexual
harassment that caused emotional distress manifested by physical symptoms),
with Domeny v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2010-9, at 5 (2010) (holding that
§ 104(a)(2) excluded the taxpayer’s settlement award from her employer where
she alleged that the employer’s conduct caused emotional distress manifested by
physical symptoms), and Parkinson v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2010-142, at 7
(2010) (holding that § 104(a)(2) excluded the taxpayer’s settlement award for his
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim when his emotional distress
was manifested by a second heart attack).
243. Sanford v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2008-158, at 1 (holding that § 104(a)(2)
did not exclude the taxpayer’s damages received from a legal action against her
employer for employment discrimination and sexual harassment that caused
emotional distress manifested by physical symptoms).
244. See id.
245. See id. (detailing the taxpayer’s claims against the USPS).
246. Id.
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Additionally, she alleged that a USPS coworker sexually harassed
her.247
The EEOC found the taxpayer was discriminated against
because of her sex, and that she was sexually harassed.248 The
USPS Final Agency Decision awarded the taxpayer “compensatory
damages of $7,662 in past medical expenses and transportation,
$14,033 for past benefits lost (leave without pay), and $12,000 in
nonpecuniary compensatory damages.”249 In 2003, the USPS paid
the taxpayer the total damages of $33,695.250 The taxpayer then
appealed the USPS Final Agency Decision to the EEOC.251 On
appeal, the EEOC “noted that [the taxpayer] had provided
sufficient documentation to substantiate or justify her request for
additional compensatory damages,” with documentation consisting
of statements from her friends, coworkers, and psychologist.252 The
EEOC also noted that the documentation showed the taxpayer
“experienced physical symptoms” due to the emotional distress and
psychiatric problems that the long-term harassment created.253
These physical symptoms included “intensification of petitioner’s
asthma, sleep deprivation, skin irritation, appetite loss, severe
headaches, and depression.”254 Accordingly, the EEOC modified
the USPS Final Agency Decision, determining that “USPS should
pay [the taxpayer] a total of $115,000 in nonpecuniary damages,
$33,542 in future pecuniary losses, $7,662 for medical expenses,
and $14,033 for use of annual leave.”255 In 2004, the USPS paid the
taxpayer the damages.256
The taxpayer failed to report any of the damages received in
the legal action as income on her 2003 and 2004 tax returns,257

247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. See id. at 2 (“Petitioner appealed the $33,695 USPS Final Agency
Decision to the EEOC.”).
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
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and the Service determined a deficiency.258 The Tax Court
considered whether § 104(a)(2) excluded the taxpayer’s received
compensation for “nonpecuniary damages and future pecuniary
losses.”259 The court’s analysis began by noting that “gross income
is broad in scope, while exclusions from income are narrowly
construed.”260 Then, the court reiterated § 104(a)(2)’s text,
specifically stating that “emotional distress is not treated as a
personal physical injury or physical sickness.”261 Because the
Service conceded the taxpayer’s underlying cause of action was
“based in tort or tort-type rights,” the court proceeded to
determine whether the taxpayer’s damages were received on
account of her physical injuries or physical sickness.262
The court concluded that the taxpayer’s nonpecuniary
damages and future pecuniary losses “were not received on
account of personal physical injury or physical sickness” and thus
not excluded from her gross income under § 104(a)(2).263 Because
the taxpayer did not meet the requirements for “medical care”
deductions under § 213, the court also concluded the taxpayer
could not exclude the portion of the award attributed to medical
expenses.264 When analyzing the nonpecuniary damages and
future pecuniary losses portion, the court looked to the EEOC
and USPS decisions, which noted that the taxpayer’s sexual
harassment “caused her emotional distress.”265 Further, the court
acknowledged that the taxpayer’s “emotional distress manifested
258. Id.
259. See id. at 3 (“We now consider whether petitioner must include in
income the portion of the award for nonpecuniary damages and future pecuniary
losses.”).
260. Id. (citing Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 328 (1995)).
261. See id. (“Emotional distress is not treated as a personal physical injury
or physical sickness.” (citing I.R.C. § 104(a) (2006))).
262. See id. (noting that the Service conceded that the taxpayers met the
“tort or tort-type rights” requirement and proceeding to determine whether the
damages were received “on account of” her physical injuries or physical
sickness).
263. See id. at 4 (“We conclude that the [damages] awarded to [the taxpayer]
as a result of the legal action were not received on account of personal physical
injury or physical sickness. [The taxpayer] therefore must include these
damages in her income under section 104(a)(2).”).
264. See id. (concluding that § 104(a)(2) did not exclude taxpayer’s portion of
the award for “past medical expenses and transportation”).
265. Id. at 3.
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itself in [the] physical symptoms” noted in the EEOC decision but
found that “[t]hese physical symptoms were not the basis of the
award.”266 Instead, the taxpayer was awarded relief for sexual
harassment
and
sex-based
discrimination,
and
was
“compensated . . . for the emotional distress she suffered because
of the sexual harassment.”267 Importantly, the Tax Court stated
that “[d]amages received on account of emotional distress, even
when resultant physical symptoms occur, are not excludable from
income under section 104(a)(2).”268 This statement is entirely
consistent with § 104(a)(2)’s legislative history in which Congress
provided that the term “emotional distress” included symptoms.
B. Domeny v. Commissioner
Less than two years later, in Domeny v. Commissioner,269 the
Tax Court reached a conclusion directly contrary to Sanford.270
After being terminated, the taxpayer complained that her preexisting multiple sclerosis (MS) “spik[ed],” and that she suffered
“shooting pain up her legs, fatigue, burning eyes, spinning head,
vertigo, and lightheadedness.”271 Before filing suit, however, the
taxpayer’s attorney negotiated a settlement agreement with her
former employer.272 In the settlement agreement, the taxpayer
released potential claims under the ADA, the ADEA, and
potential claims for invasion of privacy, defamation and
misrepresentation, and infliction of emotional distress.273 The

266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. (citing Hawkins v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2005-149 (2005)).
269. Domeny v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2010-9, at 5 (2010) (holding that
§ 104(a)(2) excluded the taxpayer’s settlement award from her employer where
she alleged that the employer’s conduct caused emotional distress manifested by
physical symptoms).
270. See id. at 5 (concluding § 104(a)(2) excluded the taxpayer’s settlement
award because her work environment exacerbated her physical illness).
271. Id. at 2.
272. See id. (noting that a settlement agreement was reached before any suit
was filed).
273. See id. (listing the causes of action that the taxpayer released pursuant
to the settlement agreement).
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settlement agreement made no mention of the taxpayer’s alleged
physical symptoms.274
The taxpayer’s employer paid a total of $33,308 under the
agreement.275 Of the total, $16,375 was sent directly to the
taxpayer’s attorney.276 The Tax Court addressed the sole question
of whether § 104(a)(2) excluded the settlement agreement’s
remaining $16,933, which was sent directly to the taxpayer and
not included as income on her tax return.277
The court began by noting that the taxpayer believed she was
being compensated “for physical injuries that occurred in a
hostile work environment.”278 Next, the court noted § 104(a)(2)’s
text, including the post-amble, which states that “emotional
distress shall not be treated as physical injury or physical
sickness.”279 After summarily concluding the settlement
agreement was ambiguous, the court proceeded to analyze the
payor’s intent.280 The court also concluded that the taxpayer’s
claim against her employer was based on tort or tort-type
rights.281 Finally, the court analyzed whether there was a “direct
causal link” between the damages and the taxpayer’s alleged
physical injuries.282
The taxpayer’s employer did not withhold taxes on the
$16,933 at issue and labeled the amount as “[n]onemployee
compensation.”283 Based on this fact alone, the Tax Court inferred
that the taxpayer’s employer “was aware that at least part of [the
taxpayer’s] recovery may not have been subject to tax; i.e., was
due to physical illness.”284 The court then coupled that inference
274. See id. at 3 (noting that the settlement agreement contained only a list
of “numerous possible causes of action that [the taxpayer] was releasing”).
275. Id. at 2.
276. Id. Half of the $16,375 was compensation due to the taxpayer and the
taxpayer reported that as income on her 2005 tax return. Id. The taxpayer was
not issued any tax forms on the other half sent to her attorney and did not
report it as income. Id.
277. Id. at 3.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. (citing Banaitis v. Comm’r, 340 F.3d 1074, 1080 (9th Cir. 2003)).
283. Id. at 4.
284. Id.
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with the “likelihood that [the taxpayer’s] attorney represented
[the taxpayer’s] circumstances to [her employer] in the course of
the settlement negotiations.”285 Based solely on these bare
inferences—and ignoring the settlement agreement’s terms—the
Tax Court found that the taxpayer’s employer intended to
compensate her for “her acute physical illness caused by her
hostile and stressful work environment.”286 Thus, because the
taxpayer had “shown that her work environment exacerbated her
existing physical illness,” she had “shown that the only reason for
the $16,933 payment was to compensate her for her physical
injuries.”287
Domeny’s conclusion cannot be squared with Sanford. In
Sanford, the EEOC and the court explicitly noted that the
taxpayer’s emotional distress caused physical symptoms,
including intensifying her preexisting asthma.288 In Domeny, the
taxpayer’s emotional distress caused physical symptoms,
including intensifying her preexisting MS.289 Yet § 104(a)(2) was
applied to the award in Domeny and not in Sanford.290 A Tax
Court case decided later in 2010 is further indicative of this
inconsistent application.
C. Parkinson v. Commissioner
In Parkinson v. Commissioner,291 the taxpayer asserted
claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion
of privacy against his former employer (medical center) and two
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 5.
288. See Sanford v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2008-158, at 3 (2008) (“We further
acknowledge, as did the EEOC, that the emotional distress manifested itself in
physical symptoms such as asthma.”).
289. See Domeny v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2010-9, at 2 (2010) (noting that the
taxpayer suffered physical symptoms of her emotional distress, including
exacerbating her preexisting MS).
290. See supra Parts VI.A–B (discussing Sanford and Domeny).
291. See Parkinson v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2010-142, at 7 (2010) (holding
that § 104(a)(2) excluded the taxpayer’s settlement award for his intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim when his emotional distress was
manifested by a second heart attack).

2310

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2273 (2012)

named coworkers.292 The taxpayer’s complaint alleged that the
two named coworkers “harassed and harangued” him, causing
him to suffer “severe emotional distress, manifested by
permanent, irreparable physical harm in the form of his second
heart attack.”293 For both claims, the “complaint sought $500,000
in compensatory damages, $500,000 in punitive damages,
attorney’s fees, and costs.”294 The day after a jury trial began, the
“medical center agree[d] to pay [the taxpayer] $350,000 ‘as
noneconomic damages and not as wages or other income,’”295 and
the taxpayer agreed to drop all claims.296 In 2005, the taxpayer
received a $34,000 payment pursuant to the settlement
agreement but failed to report this amount on his 2005 federal
income tax return.297
After considering the settlement agreement’s terms and the
payor’s intent, the court first concluded that “the entire
settlement payment [wa]s allocable to [the taxpayer’s] cause of
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.”298 Then, the
Tax Court concluded that § 104(a)(2) excluded one-half of the
taxpayer’s 2005 settlement payment because it “was made on
account of [the taxpayer’s] physical injuries.”299 In support of its
conclusion, the court looked to the 1996 Act’s House Report.300
First, the Tax Court acknowledged the House Report
provided that the term “emotional distress” included
symptoms.301 Next, the court quoted the portion of the House
Report that stated that “[b]ecause all damages received on
account of physical injury or physical sickness are excludable
from gross income, the exclusion . . . applies to any damages
received based on a claim of emotional distress that is

292. See id. at 1–2 (detailing the taxpayer’s complaint).
293. Id. at 2.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. See id. (“Pursuant to the settlement agreement [the taxpayer] agreed to
drop all his claims.”).
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. See id. at 6 (finding one-half of the settlement amount excluded).
300. Id. at 5.
301. Id.
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attributable to a physical injury or physical sickness.”302 The
court stated that this language, with respect to a claim for
emotional distress, indicated Congress’s intent to distinguish
“damages attributable to physical injury or physical sickness,
which are excludable, from damages attributable to emotional
distress or ‘symptoms’ thereof, which are not excludable.”303 The
court took the House Report’s language out of context and read it
incorrectly.
Parkinson dropped the origin of the action portion of the
House Report, focusing instead only on the end result. The House
Report provided that damages for emotional distress qualified for
§ 104(a)(2)’s exclusion only when a personal physical injury or
physical sickness caused emotional distress.304 In other words,
when a taxpayer’s personal physical injury or physical sickness
causes the taxpayer to suffer emotional distress, then the
damages allocated to such emotional distress will be on account of
the personal physical injury or physical sickness. As Parkinson
reads the House Report, damages allocated to a physical
symptom of emotional distress would fall within § 104(a)(2)’s
exclusion because they are on account of the physical symptom.
Under that reading, damages allocated to emotional distress
caused by a physical injury or physical sickness would be on
account of emotional distress. This is directly contrary to the
statute’s text and its legislative history. Section 104(a) explicitly
states that damages on account of emotional distress should be
included in income.305 Congress intended for damages allocable to
emotional distress caused by a physical injury to fall within
§ 104(a)(2)’s exclusion only because all of those damages have
their “origin in a physical injury or physical sickness.”306

302. Id.
303. Id.
304. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 163, at 301 (providing that § 104(a)(2)
excluded damages allocated to emotional distress “on account of” a physical
injury or physical sickness).
305. See I.R.C. § 104(a) (2006) (“[E]motional distress shall not be treated as
a physical injury or physical sickness.”).
306. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 163, at 301 (providing that § 104(a)(2)
excluded damages allocated to emotional distress “on account of” a physical
injury or physical sickness).
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Next, the Tax Court stated it was “self-evident that a heart
attack and its physical aftereffects constitute physical injury or
sickness rather than mere subjective sensations or symptoms of
emotional distress.”307 A heart attack is undoubtedly a “severe”
physical symptom, but it is a “symptom” nonetheless. In fact, the
taxpayer stated in his complaint that he “suffered severe
emotional distress, manifested by permanent, irreparable
physical harm in the form of his second heart attack.”308 Because
the taxpayer’s emotional distress manifested itself with such a
severe physical symptom, he received a large sum as settlement
for his claim.309 This does not mean, however, that the taxpayer’s
larger sum should not be taxed, while someone suffering a
“milder” physical symptom—and consequently receiving a
smaller settlement—should be taxed.310
Lastly, the Tax Court relied on treatise excerpts, stating that
when a plaintiff is compensated for emotional distress that is
evidenced by physical symptoms, both the mental and physical
elements have been compensated.311 The Tax Court is correct that
the medical center compensated the taxpayer for both elements of
his emotional distress. But simply because both the mental and
the physical elements have been compensated for does not mean
each element should be taxed separately rather than taxed as one
recovery for emotional distress. Under Parkinson’s reasoning,
every taxpayer suffering a physical symptom of emotional
distress would be entitled to exclude a court-determined amount
of any potential recovery under § 104(a)(2). The analytical
difficulties of drawing a line between the emotional and the
physical elements would make judicial determinations, at best,

307. Parkinson v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2010-142, at 5 (2010).
308. Id. at 2.
309. The taxpayer received $350,000. Id.
310. See, e.g., Murphy v. Internal Revenue Serv., 493 F.3d 170, 176 (D.C.
Cir. 2007) (concluding that § 104(a)(2) did not exclude the taxpayer’s $70,000
award for emotional injuries manifested by physical symptoms, such as
“bruxism”).
311. See Parkinson, T.C. Memo. 2010-142, at 5–6 (stating that, when a
plaintiff is compensated for emotional distress accompanied by physical
symptoms, both the physical and the mental elements have been compensated
(citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1)) (1965); W. PAGE KEETON ET
AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 12, at 64 (5th ed. 1984)).
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wildly speculative. As a result, the tax consequences of emotional
distress recoveries would be entirely unpredictable.
Moreover, when Congress stated that the term emotional
distress includes symptoms that may result from such emotional
distress,312 it indicated that § 104(a)(2)’s exclusion does not
consider emotional distress’s physical symptoms as a stand-alone
physical injury or physical sickness. Instead, a recovery for
“emotional distress” encompasses its physical symptoms, no
matter their severity. As the Tax Court previously stated,
“[d]amages received on account of emotional distress, even when
resultant physical symptoms occur, are not excludable from
income under section 104(a)(2).”313
VII. Proposal: A New Test
Before the 1996 Act, the “origin” of the “personal injury”
giving rise to damages was a nonissue for a few reasons. First,
Burke’s “tort or tort-type rights” test ensured that § 104(a)(2)
excluded only damages compensating for personal-injury torts, or
for personal injuries where the full range of tort-type remedies
were available.314 The test intended to “distinguish damages for
personal injuries from, for example, damages for breach of
contract.”315 Second, § 104(a)(2) excluded all personal injuries,
physical, nonphysical, and emotional.316
312. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 163, at 301 n.56 (stating that the term
emotional distress includes symptoms that may result from such emotional
distress).
313. Sanford v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2008-158, at 3 (2008) (citing Hawkins
v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2005-149 (2005)).
314. See Damages Received on Account of Personal Physical Injuries or
Physical Sickness, 74 Fed. Reg. 47,152, 47,153 (proposed Sept. 15, 2009) (to be
codified at 26 C.F.R. § 1.104-1) [hereinafter Proposed Regulation] (stating that
the “tort or tort type rights” requirement “intended to ensure that only damages
compensating for torts and similar personal injuries qualif[ied] for exclusion
under § 104(a)(2)”).
315. See Damages Received on Account of Personal Physical Injuries or
Physical Sickness, 77 Fed. Reg. 3106, 3107 (Jan. 23, 2012) (to be codified at
26 C.F.R. § 1.104-1) [hereinafter Final Regulation] (“The tort-type rights test
was intended to distinguish damages for personal injuries from, for example,
damages for breach of contract.”).
316. See United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 235 n.6 (1992) (noting that
the exclusion’s scope had previously been limited to only physical injuries, but
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After the 1996 Act, on the other hand, Treasury amended its
§ 104(a)(2) regulations that served as the basis for Burke’s
requirement, thus eliminating Burke’s tort or tort-type rights
test.317 In the amendment’s proposal, Treasury stated that
judicial and legislative developments—including the 1996 Act—
have “eliminated the need to base the section 104(a)(2) exclusion
on tort and remedies concepts.”318 The amended regulations
extend § 104(a)(2)’s exclusion to “personal physical injuries or
physical sickness not defined as torts under state and common
law,” and to no-fault statutes.319 Section 104(a)(2)’s exclusion no
longer “depend[s] on the scope of remedies available under state
or common law.”320 Replacing the tort or tort-type rights
requirement, the amended regulations define § 104(a)(2)
“damages” as “an amount received (other than workers’
compensation) through prosecution of a legal suit or action, or
through a settlement agreement entered into in lieu of
prosecution.”321
Additionally, § 104(a)(2) now excludes only damages received
“on account of personal physical injuries or physical sickness.”322
Because of the added “physical” requirement, defendants can be
liable for “personal injury” compensatory damages that
§ 104(a)(2) no longer excludes. For example, a defendant’s
conduct may directly cause a taxpayer to suffer emotional
distress. Before the 1996 Act, the taxpayer’s emotional distress
would have qualified as a “personal injury” for purposes of
§ 104(a)(2)’s exclusion. If the defendant then paid the taxpayer
damages on account of such emotional distress, § 104(a)(2) would
exclude those damages as being on account of a personal injury.
Now, however, because § 104(a) prohibits emotional distress from
being treated as a physical injury or physical sickness, § 104(a)(2)
that it was now settled that it extended to “nonphysical injuries to the
individual”).
317. See Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (as amended in 2012) (eliminating the “tort
or tort type rights” requirement).
318. Proposed Regulation, supra note 314, at 47,153.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (as amended in 2012).
322. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2006) (emphasis added); see supra Part IV
(discussing the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996).
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does not exclude damages received on account of the “personal
injury” of emotional distress. Thus, defendants can be liable for
“personal injury” compensatory damages—damages that would
have been excluded before the 1996 Act—without directly causing
a “physical injury or physical sickness.”
This creates the problem that was illustrated in Domeny and
in Parkinson. According to Domeny and Parkinson, damages
allocated to a physical symptom of emotional distress may be
excluded if the taxpayer could show that the damages
compensated for, or were “on account of,” the physical
symptom.323 In Lindsey, the Eighth Circuit implied that to do so,
a taxpayer simply has to alert the defendant to the taxpayer’s
physical symptom and then prove that at least a portion of the
award is intended to compensate for the physical symptom.324
This result directly contradicts the exclusion’s text, however,
which states that “emotional distress shall not be treated as a
physical injury or physical sickness” for purposes of § 104(a)(2)’s
exclusion,325 and the House Report, which states that “emotional
distress” includes resulting symptoms.326 To remedy this
contradiction, it is necessary to focus on whether the taxpayer’s
action against the defendant has its origin in a physical injury or
physical sickness.
As Treasury noted when it proposed amending its
regulations, judicial and legislative developments have affected
§ 104(a)(2)’s exclusion.327 Most importantly, the 1996 Act added
the requirement that a taxpayer’s “personal injury or sickness”
must be “physical.”328 To accommodate that added requirement, a
new test needs to be implemented to prevent results—such as

323. See supra Parts VI.B–C (discussing Domeny and Parkinson).
324. Supra notes 239–41 and accompanying text.
325. I.R.C. § 104(a).
326. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 163, at 301 n.56 (stating that the term
emotional distress includes symptoms that may result from such emotional
distress).
327. See Proposed Regulation, supra note 314, at 47, 152–53 (noting that
judicial and legislative developments have affected § 104(a)(2)’s exclusion that
Treasury’s proposed regulations reflect the statutory developments).
328. Amos v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 2003-329, at 4 (2003) (“The 1996
amendment . . . imposes an additional requirement for an amount to qualify for
exclusion from gross income under that section.”).
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Domeny and Parkinson—that contradict § 104(a)(2)’s text and
legislative history.
Under the new test, to be excluded from gross income under
§ 104(a)(2): (1) an amount must be received (other than workers’
compensation) through prosecution of a legal suit or action, or
through a settlement agreement entered into in lieu of
prosecution; (2) such legal suit or action must have its origin in a
physical injury or physical sickness; and (3) the amount must be
received on account of such physical injury or physical sickness.
The test’s three requirements must each be satisfied
independently. The first requirement is taken from § 104(a)(2)’s
text and Treasury’s proposed regulations. As Treasury intended,
it replaces the tort or tort-type rights requirement and defines
§ 104(a)(2) “damages.” The requirement functions as Treasury
detailed in its proposed regulations above329 and thus needs no
additional explanation here. The test’s third requirement derives
from § 104(a)(2)’s on account of text and incorporates all the case
law interpreting that language. The cases interpreting on account
of are detailed earlier in Part III of this Note.330 Accordingly, the
third requirement also requires no further explanation here. The
test’s second requirement derives from § 104(a)(2)’s text combined
with Congress’s language in the House Report. The test’s second
requirement works in unity with the first and needs additional
explanation.
A. The “Origin” Requirement
When a statute is ambiguous on its face—as § 104(a)(2)’s
language has always been331—courts should view the legislative
history to determine Congress’s intent.332 Appropriately, then, the
test’s second requirement is drawn from the House Report that
329. Supra notes 318–21 and accompanying text.
330. See supra Part III (discussing the case law refining § 104(a)(2)’s “on
account of” text).
331. See O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 79 (1996) (acknowledging
that the “on account of” phrase in § 104(a)(2) is ambiguous).
332. See Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453
U.S. 1, 13 (1981) (stating that the Court first looks to the statutory text and
then reviews the legislative history to determine congressional intent).

PHYSICAL CONSEQUENCES

2317

gave guidance on how to apply the amended § 104(a)(2)
exclusion.333 According to the House Report, to qualify for
§ 104(a)(2)’s exclusion, the taxpayer’s “action” against the
defendant must have its “origin in a physical injury or physical
sickness.”334 This requirement, combined with the regulations’
use of “legal suit or action,” forms the test’s second component.
The word “origin” is commonly defined as “the point at which
something begins or rises” or as “something that creates, causes,
or gives rise to another.”335 Thus, to qualify for § 104(a)(2)’s
exclusion, a physical injury or physical sickness must create,
cause, or give rise to the taxpayer’s “legal suit or action” against
the defendant. Except in the context of a wrongful death or
survival suit, this origin requirement will be satisfied only when
the defendant’s conduct directly causes the taxpayer’s personal
physical injury or physical sickness, thus giving rise to the
taxpayer’s action against the defendant. This requires that there
be a “direct causal link” between the defendant’s conduct and the
taxpayer’s personal physical injury or physical sickness.
For example, in Schleier’s automobile accident illustration,
the taxpayer’s personal physical injuries suffered in the
automobile accident gave rise to the taxpayer’s negligence action
against the defendant.336 Without an intervening emotional
injury, the defendant’s negligent conduct directly caused the
taxpayer’s personal physical injuries, including bruises, cuts, or
broken bones. Because the defendant directly caused the
taxpayer’s personal physical injuries, the defendant was liable for
damages on account of the taxpayer’s personal physical injuries.
Thus, the taxpayer’s “legal suit or action” against the defendant—
that may have resulted in other claims such as lost wages, or
333. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 163, at 301 (providing the “origin”
requirement).
334. See id. (“If an action has its origin in a physical injury or physical
sickness, then all damages (other than punitive damages) that flow therefrom
are treated as payments received on account of physical injury or physical
sickness . . . .”); see also Wood, supra note 167, at 5 (“Congress require[s] that
the action have its origin in a physical injury or sickness.”).
335. Origin Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/origin (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (defining origin) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
336. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (using an automobile
accident example to illustrate a personal injury).
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pain, suffering, and emotional distress—had its origin in a
physical injury or physical sickness.
In the context of a wrongful death or survival suit, the
taxpayer’s action against the defendant has its origin in a
physical injury or physical sickness because the taxpayer’s action
originated out of the decedent’s death, which the defendant
directly caused. Because the taxpayer could not have prosecuted
the action against the defendant absent the decedent’s personal
physical injury of death, the decedent’s death gave rise to the
spouse’s action. Therefore, the decedent’s death was the origin of
the spouse’s wrongful death or survival action against the
defendant. The taxpayer’s action may then include claims for loss
of consortium and pain, suffering, and emotional distress, but the
action’s origin was in a physical injury or physical sickness.337
On the other hand, the origin requirement will not be
satisfied when the defendant’s conduct directly causes the
taxpayer to suffer emotional distress manifested by a physical
symptom, even if the physical symptom alone could be considered
a physical injury or physical sickness. With employment
discrimination or wrongful termination, the defendant’s conduct
directly causes lost wages and nonphysical personal injuries, such
as emotional distress, but does not directly cause a physical
injury or physical sickness.338 Because the defendant’s conduct
only directly causes the taxpayer’s emotional distress, there is no
direct causal link between the defendant’s conduct and the
taxpayer’s physical symptom. The taxpayer can still bring an
action against the defendant for infliction of emotional distress
and lost wages, but the action would not have its origin in a
physical injury or physical sickness. Thus, the taxpayer would
fail to meet the test’s second requirement.
In Parkinson, for example, the defendant’s conduct directly
caused the taxpayer’s emotional distress.339 The taxpayer’s
emotional distress then manifested itself with the severe physical
337. Cf. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 163, at 301 (noting that a taxpayer’s
claim for loss of consortium due to his spouse’s physical injury or physical
sickness would be excluded from gross income).
338. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (using an automobile
accident example to illustrate a personal injury).
339. See supra Part VI.C (discussing Parkinson v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
2010-142 (2010)).
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symptom of a heart attack. The taxpayer’s emotional distress
severed the direct causal link between the defendant’s conduct
and the physical symptom. Thus, the taxpayer’s heart attack was
not the origin of his action against the defendant. Rather, the
taxpayer’s severe emotional distress was the origin of his action
against the defendant and the emotional distress then gave rise
to his physical injury.
Importantly, the immediacy of the physical symptom’s onset
does not affect this result. Consider a taxpayer-employee that is
deathly afraid of snakes.340 If her employer places a rubber snake
in her office and she immediately suffers a heart attack upon
seeing the snake, her heart attack will not be the origin of her
action against her employer. Instead, her cause of action for
infliction of emotional distress will have its origin in her severe
emotional distress, which was manifested by a heart attack.341
These consequential physical symptoms may, of course, indicate
the severity of the defendant-inflicted emotional distress and
thus increase the total damages sum.342 But this does not mean
that a taxpayer suffering physical consequences of emotional
distress should be better off from a tax perspective than a
taxpayer whose emotional distress does not have physical
consequences.
Admittedly, there can be confusion when the defendant
simultaneously inflicts separate emotional and physical injuries.
This scenario is best illustrated in the sexual harassment and
false imprisonment contexts. As the Service explained in a
private letter ruling in 2000, when sexual harassment takes the
form of an “unwanted or uninvited physical contact[] resulting in
observable bodily harms,” then § 104(a)(2) excludes damages
allocable to such injuries.343 But when the sexual harassment is
340. This example was provided by Professor Brant J. Hellwig.
341. If the employee died as a result of her heart attack and her husband
brought a wrongful death action against her employer, then the husband’s
action would have its origin in the physical injury of death. Thus, § 104(a)(2)
would exclude damages that he received “on account of” his wife’s death.
342. Cf. Murphy v. Internal Revenue Serv., 493 F.3d 170, 176 (D.C. Cir.
2007) (noting that the Administrative Law Judge may have considered the
taxpayer’s physical injuries “indicative of the severity of [her] emotional
distress”).
343. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200041022 (Oct. 13, 2000) (providing that
§ 104(a)(2) would exclude damages allocated to “unwanted or uninvited physical

2320

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2273 (2012)

nonphysical and causes the taxpayer to suffer emotional distress
§ 104(a)(2) does not exclude any damages attributable to the
emotional distress, even if accompanied by physical symptoms.344
Similarly, as the Sixth Circuit explained in Stadnyk, false
imprisonment does not necessarily involve a physical injury.345
Presumably, if the false imprisonment took the form of an
“unwanted or uninvited physical contact[] resulting in observable
bodily harms,” then § 104(a)(2) would exclude damages attributable
to such injuries.346 But § 104(a)(2) would not exclude damages
attributable to emotional distress resulting from the false
imprisonment’s nonphysical aspects, such as confinement alone.347
In these scenarios, the physical injury or physical sickness does
not have to be the action’s sole origin. Because the defendant
directly caused the taxpayer’s personal physical injury, and that
personal physical injury is one of the origins of the taxpayer’s action
against the defendant, the test’s second requirement would be met.
A court would then have to determine what portion of the damages
is on account of the taxpayer’s personal physical injuries, and thus
excluded by § 104(a)(2). Section 104(a)(2) would not, however,
exclude the portion of damages flowing from, or directly caused by,
the taxpayer’s emotional distress, except in the amount not
exceeding qualifying medical care under § 213.

contacts resulting in observable bodily harms”).
344. See id. (providing that § 104(a)(2) would exclude only damages allocated
to “unwanted or uninvited physical contacts resulting in observable bodily
harms”); see also Sanford v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2008-158, at 1 (2008) (holding
that § 104(a)(2) did not exclude the taxpayer’s damages received from a legal
action against her employer for sexual harassment that caused emotional
distress manifested by physical symptoms).
345. See Stadnyk v. Comm’r, 367 F. App’x 586, 593 (6th Cir. 2010)
(determining that a false imprisonment victim is not necessarily physically
injured).
346. Cf. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200041022 (Oct. 13, 2000) (sexual harassment).
347. Cf. Stadnyk, 367 F. App’x at 594 (holding that the taxpayer’s award for
false imprisonment claims could not be excluded from gross income under
§ 104(a)(2) because there was no “causal connection between any physical injury
and the settlement award”).
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VIII. Conclusion
Of course, it still remains difficult to draw the line between
physical and nonphysical. Some commentators have suggested that
§ 104(a)(2)’s exclusion be repealed due to the difficulty with drawing
such a line.348 Others have suggested rewriting the exclusion to
apply only to damages attributable to lost human capital,349 or that
the Service adopt definitions from the Restatement (Third) of
Torts.350 No matter where the line is drawn between physical and
nonphysical, however, some taxpayers will be better off than others.
Although Congress did not explicitly define physical when it
amended § 104(a)(2),351 it stated both in the statutory text and the
House Report that “emotional distress shall not be treated as a
physical injury or physical sickness” for purposes of the exclusion.352
Importantly, the House Report provided that the term emotional
distress includes symptoms that may result from such emotional
distress.353 By providing that emotional distress and its resulting
symptoms are not to be treated as a physical injury or physical
sickness, Congress excluded emotional distress from its definition of
physical. Section 104(a)(2) does not exclude a taxpayer’s recovery for
emotional distress, unless an originating physical injury or physical
sickness causes the taxpayer’s emotional distress. To prevent the
inconsistency of having § 104(a)(2)’s gross income exclusion
extended to some physical symptoms of emotional distress, but not
others, it is necessary to focus on whether the taxpayer’s action has
its origin in a physical injury or physical sickness.
348. See Barret, supra note 13, at 1194 (“In order to promote predictability
and consistency, the exclusion should be eliminated.”).
349. See Frank J. Doti, Personal Injury Income Tax Exclusion: An Analysis
and Update, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 61, 62 (1997) (proposing that § 104(a)(2) should
be redrafted and only encompass “damages attributable to lost human capital
and not lost wages and earning power”).
350. See Wright, supra note 7, at 215 (proposing that the Restatement
(Third) of Torts’ definition be adopted).
351. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 163, at 300–01 (failing to define
“physical injury or physical sickness”); see also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200041022
(Oct. 13, 2000) (“The term ‘personal physical injuries’ is not defined in either
§ 104(a)(2) or the legislative history of the 1996 Act.”).
352. See supra Part III (discussing the Small Business Job Protection Act of
1996).
353. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 163, at 301 n.56 (stating that the term
“emotional distress” includes symptoms).

